好像全球投资者刚开始愿意重新考虑在外上市中国概念股之时，7月18日卡森·布洛克（Carson Block）的“浑水公司”对北京的新东方教育科技（NYSE：EDU）传播了毁灭性的评价报告。来自最著名专注中国股票做空机构的报告仅仅有一天之后的时间随之美国证券交易委员会向新东方起步调查的消息所导致对新东方股票恐慌性抛售。 

总之而言，SEC调查加上浑水指控新东方“对投资者撒谎”的新闻引起该公司股价暴跌将近60%而蒸发约20亿美元市值的市值。作为蒸蒸日上的国内英语教育行业的领导者，以及在2011年经受严厉审查并大量投资者跑走的在美上市中国概念股中表现较好的公司，如果像新东方名誉高大的企业都不能提供诚实可靠的投资机会，那么还有哪只中国股票可以信任吗？

虽然现在就对浑水的指控和SEC的审查下最终结论为时过早，但目前的情况看涨远远超过看跌。

首先，不同于以往曝光的典型中国欺诈上市公司的行为，新东方的管理层已经表现出对信息的高度敏感和迅速反应。浑水的指控出来的24小时以内，新东方的管理层已经拿出了数据直接驳斥最主要的一项指控，即公司伪造报表将据信来自加盟商的收入加入到公司自营的学校之中。一样反驳公司毛利率也存在被巨大修饰的质疑——新东方和几位投行分析师都已经出具信息表明浑水的计算方法含有基本缺陷。

新东方股价表现要面临的另一个重大问题涉及其可变利益实体（VIE）公司结构的架构：即另一个遭到卖空以及SEC调查的重要因素之一。

对于在境外上市中国公司而言，可变利益实体结构是非常重要的组成部分，因为它由于间接方式允许国外投资者参股某些在中国限制或禁止外资入股的重点行业，如教育、互联网等等。一直以来，它都充当了平衡中国公司对于国外金融结构的需求以及中国当局对于具有新兴战略性产业的担心的一种至多算是并不完美的解决方案。

作为一个相对公平的考量，浑水指出了新东方的可变利益实体结构相较于他眼中的可变利益实体机构最佳范本的中国搜索引擎巨头百度（NASDAQ: BIDU）而言相对薄弱的一些地方。尽管SEC尚未公布对于新东方上市结构的具体疑问，即使假设做空者 “新东方的VIE十分脆弱”的结论，本身也很难成为令人信服的证据证明这家公司有致命的缺陷。

公司管理层和SEC如何应对投资者对公司可变利益实体结构的顾虑成为了新东方在美国股市前景至关重要的问题。理想的情况下，管理层将积极寻找途径改善其企业结构，以加强对外部投资者保护。这不仅是最佳实践，而会有助于避免未来的监管审查和做空来袭。

如果管理层最近行动算是露出了公司要走的方向，那么新东方的领导们对于恢复投资者信心并继续致力于其美国上市之路似乎很有诚意。在否认对于公司的各项指控的同时，公司高层宣布计划在接下来的90天里用个人资金在市场上回购价值高达5,000万美元的新东方股票。

新东方董事会还成立了特别委员会来审查浑水的各项指控，再次展现了良好的公司治理实践。该委员会由三名独立董事（尤其是百度CEO兼新东方独立董事李彦宏 ）组成，并且有权利委派为外部顾问进行调查。

因此尽管遭遇了连续两天的股价混乱，新东方似乎要重新站稳脚跟。股票遭抛售的当周公司股票的最终报收价格比周三浑水报告发布后的最低点高出36%。如果“中国熊派”希望通过袭击新东方成为进一步破坏在美上市中国企业群的著名成就案，恐怕这次他们很可能会失望的。

事实上，一向标榜洞察中国并且能够颠覆华尔街有名金融家投资智慧的中国股票做空机构近期似乎有失水准。浑水自2011年6月开始对展讯通信（NASDAQ: SPRD），自2011年11月开始对分众传媒（NASDAQ: FMCN），以及自2012年4月开始对傅氏科普威（NASDAQ: FSIN）的一系列攻击都在“曝光”这些公司的所谓幕后故事以来的他们股票反而走上升的趋势，以失败告终。

另一家突出的做空机构香橼研究（Citron Research），尽管对外宣称“了解中国”，其于2011年11月对奇虎360（NYSE: QIHU）和2012年6月对恒大地产（3333: HK）进行的攻击并未产生预期的影响，或是只有股价的小幅下挫。在2011年6月呼吁投资者抛售哈尔滨电器之后的5个月里，该公司完成了以每股24美元的价格退市，相比香橼研究号召投资者脱手时的价格溢价高达46%。

中国股票的做空机构因为他们所曝光真正的诈骗案例而赢得赞誉。然而类似嘉汉林业和东南融通等数十亿美元股票的破产和不光彩的退市丑闻自2011年2季度做空风暴之后就没有再发生过。像以前明目张胆，大规模的来自中国的股票欺诈越来越有可能永远成为过去了。

虽然中国概念股的做空机构在退步，但中美国两国的监管机构还面对许多工作才能达成可行的、双方能接受的方案解决遗留问题，如确保VIE结构的完整性以及向在美上市中国企业的国内审计质量等还需要克服很多困难。解决这些问题也许不那么容易，但如果中国公司和国内外投资者想不断地从国际股市的流动中互相受益而如此支持世界第二大经济体的中国的商业发展，这些问题就必须解决。要是不解决就等于对企业、市场和投资者的事实上“卖空”。

（下页为英文对照版）

Chinese Stocks: “Shorting Out” the Truth

Rob Koepp, Author ofBetting on China: Chinese Stocks, American Stock Markets, and the Wagers on a New Dynamic in Global Capitalism (Wiley, 2012)

Just when the time seemed right for global investors to take another look at Chinese stocks, on July 18 Carson Block’s Muddy Waters Research came out with a damning appraisal of Beijing-based New Oriental Education & Technology (NYSE:EDU).  The report from the best-known China short seller followed by just one day a panic selloff accompanying news that New Oriental was being investigated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 

 All told, EDU shares plunged nearly 60% (wiping out about $2 billion in market cap) on the back of the SEC investigation and Muddy Waters allegations that the company is flatly “lying to shareholders.”  Regarded as the leader in China’s strong performing English education industry—and a company whose share price fared comparatively well during the hyper scrutiny and massive flight from US-listed Chinese stocks in 2011—if New Oriental does not offer an honest investment opportunity, can any Chinese stock be trusted?     

Although it would be premature to pass final assessments on the Muddy Waters allegations and the SEC investigation, so far indicators are actually far more bullish than bearish. 

First, unlike the typical Chinese stock frauds that have been previously exposed, management at New Oriental has shown itself to be highly responsive and forthcoming with information. Within 24 hours of Muddy Waters’ attack, EDU management produced data that directly refutes the chief allegation that the company cooks its books by attributing revenue to company-owned schools that allegedly in fact comes from franchisees.  Same with accusations that its gross margins are excessive—both the company and covering analysts have presented information that shows Muddy Waters accounting methodology is simply flawed.    

The other major issue facing EDU’s stock performance concerns the organization ofits variable interest equity (VIE) corporate structure: another key item of the short sale thesis and the reason for the SEC investigation. 

The VIE structure has been an important part of the global listings for many Chinese issuers as it allows effective foreign ownership in key PRC industries like education and the Internet that restricted or prohibited outside investment.  It has been, at best, an imperfect solution to balancing the requirements of international financial structuring with the concerns of Chinese authorities over strategically important industries.

In one of its more even-handed appraisals, Muddy Waters has pointed to areas where New Oriental’s VIE structure appears to be comparatively weaker at protecting outside investor interests than Chinese search engine giant, Baidu (NASDAQ: BIDU), which it considers a best-practice VIE.  While the SEC’s specific concerns over New Oriental’s listing structure are not yet publicly known, even assuming the short seller’s conclusion that “EDU is a weak VIE,” that itself is hardly compelling evidence that the company is fatally flawed. 

How company management and the SEC work to resolve concerns over the company’s VIE structure will be crucial for the prospects of EDU’s U.S. listing.  Ideally, management will proactively look for ways to improve its corporate structure to bolster outside investor protections. This is not just good practice, but will help avoid further regulatory scrutiny and limit opportunities for future short attacks. 

If recent actions by management are any guide, EDU leadership seems sincere about restoring investor confidence and remains committed to its US listing.  Along with their pointed denials of allegations against the company, senior executives haveannounced their intention to use personal funds to purchase up to $50 million worth of EDU shares on the open market over the next 90 days.  

Also demonstrating good corporate governance procedure, New Oriental’s board has formed a special committee to review of the Muddy Waters allegations.  The committee is comprised of three independent directors, notably including Baidu CEO Yanhong “Robin” Li, and has been authorized to retain outside advisors to progress its investigation.

So despite suffering two consecutive days of share price pandemonium, EDU seems to be regaining its footing.  The stock closed out the week of the stock selloff about 36% higher than the low it had reached on Wednesday when the Muddy Waters posted its report on the Internet.  If China bears were looking for another cause célèbreto batter away at China Inc.’s presence on US equity markets, New Oriental appears likely to disappoint them. 

In fact, having once boasted about their profound insights into China and ability to upend the investment wisdom of established Wall Street names, leading China shorts have not been looking so perceptive recently.  A string of Muddy Waters’ attacks against Spreadtrum Communications (NASDAQ: SPRD) started June 2011, Focus Media (NASDAQ:FMCN)started November 2011, and Fushi Copperweld(NASDAQ: FSIN) started April 2012, has thus far failed with the shares of all three companies trending upward since being “exposed.” 

Another prominent short seller, Citron Research, although publicly proclaiming that it “knows China,” has seen attacks launched in November 2011 on Qihoo 360 (NYSE:QIHU) and June 2012 on Evergrande Real Estate (3333:HK)result in uneven impacts or only modest price declines.  After calling for a selloff on Harbin Electric in June 2011, within five months that company had completed a delisting at $24.00 per share, a hefty 46% premium over the price at which Citron had advocated that investors unload the stock. 

China shorts deserve credit for the actual frauds that they have exposed.  Yet the big score, multi-billion-dollar stock implosions and ignominious de-listings brought upon companies like Sino-Forest and Longtop Financial have not been seen since short assaults launched around the second quarter of 2011.  It seems increasingly probable that such brazen, large-scale stock frauds from China are a thing of the past.  

While the China shorts might be in retreat, American and Chinese regulators still have plenty of work cut out for them to reach practical, mutually agreeable solutions to lingering challenges like ensuring the integrity of VIE structures and the quality of audits performed in China on U.S.-listed companies.  Solutions may not be easy, but they are required if Chinese companies and global investors are to continue mutually benefitting from the flow of international public equity to support growth in the world’s second largest economy.  To fail at these tasks would constitute the real “selling short” of companies, markets, and investors.