Walt Disney, the most economically successful animator in history, observed: “All cartoon characters and fables must be exaggeration, caricatures. It is the very nature of fantasy and fable.” Exaggeration and fantasy give animation and certain genres of fiction and the arts an enduring magic. But what to make of exaggeration and fantastic conjecture when it enters supposedly serious discourse on world affairs?

Recent Chinese best sellers such as 《货币战争》（followed by 《货币战争2》）and《中国不高兴》are, by most Western standards, viewed as irrationally argued, negative emotional responses to China’s growing influence in the global economy. A Reuters article commented that “《货币战争2》will not convince many economists. But its popularity is a telling sign of China's contradictory times.”

A book review on《中国不高兴》in Time magazine remarked “it's easy to get the feeling that it's not so much China that's unhappy and angry, but the authors themselves. The brand of nationalism they preach is still a potent force, but they seem more upset about rivalries at home than abroad.”

We Americans—with our universities that are the envy of the world, unsurpassed collection of Nobel laureates and research centers, and what is supposed to be a very discerning publishing industry—tend to think that our mainstream intellectual discourse is beyond such hyperbole. Yet we have had cases like those of Ravi Batra, at the time considered a leading American economist, who published with the esteemed publisher Simon & Shuster in 1987 a book called The Great Depression of 1990. An international best seller, the book was a hot item until 1990 came and went but a Great Depression did not. The book now symbolizes of how massively wrong otherwise intelligent people can be with their analysis and predictions. 

After the Great Depression of 1990, books from recognized experts on the global economy and world affairs have tended to be more sober minded. Even if not always accurate, usually great care in the research and writing has held back tendencies towards gross exaggeration. Unfortunately for popular Western books on China, however, cartoonish portrayals continue to emerge. 

The first decade of the 21^st century has seen release of such notable works as 章家敦 （Gordon Chang）2001年 《中国即将崩溃》 (political fantasy), 加文·孟席斯（Gavin Menzies）2002年《 1421：中国发现了世界 》 (historical fantasy), and most recently in 马丁·雅克（Martin Jacques）2009年《当中国统治世界：中国的崛起和西方的衰落》（futurist fantasy）。 

Ever since Westerners first marveling at the allure of Chinese products (as the ancient Romans did of Chinese silk gauze) or trembled at the advance Asian armies (as Europeans did with the 13^th century Mongol Empire), a mixture of mystery and trepidation has characterized the image of China that is conceived in the Western imagination. In ancient times, fantastic conjectures about China were practically unavoidable given the lack of reliable information and respect of objective thought. But today, despite having access to better sources, fantastic portrayals of China by the likes of Chang, Menzies, and Jacques continue to feed misconceptions and prejudices about what China represents to the outside world.

Something issued ten years ago with the title《中国即将崩溃》should today be as much of a joke as The Great Depression of 1990 quickly became once actual events clearly repudiated the book’s outlandish theories. In the updated 2002 edition of his book, Chang proclaimed that the government of China had “run out of time.” He also claimed that the Chinese Communist Part was “at all levels, an organization out of control.” That such an unrestrainedly hysterical a book as Chang’s has itself not “run out of time” and continues still to sell so many years after its laughably ill-informed predictions reflects how many in the West continue to cling to fantasy notions of China.

《当中国统治世界 》， which recently came out in an abridged, simplified Chinese version by 中信出版社, at least goes beyond the negative Chinese stereotypes that plague 《中国即将崩溃》by showing a future China as a dominating global force rather than a hapless victim of inept government. Nevertheless, it still repeats old patterns of hackneyed “China threat” speculations and fails to deliver significant new insights about China’s evolving role in the world.  

Jacques major arguments stem from his basic (and unenlightening) observation that China is a “文明国家” (civilization-state) rather than a “民族国家” (nation-state) that typifies Western democracies. Through uncritical rehashing of economic statistics and historical analysis contributed by other experts, his supposedly novel conclusion is that “China’s impact on the world will be as great as that of the United States over the last century, probably far greater.”

Leaving aside issues with Jacques interpretation of the civilization-states versus nation-states dichotomy and his inability to critically analyze economic and historic data, his greatest fault is simply not bothering to support his conclusions about China’s future impact on the world matching or exceeding that of the United States. 

In over 400 pages of the original English version of the book, the author spends a scant 40 in the crucial chapter that finally gets around to explaining the implications of “When China Rules the World.” Here readers are treated to very thin explanations such as a mere two paragraphs on the claim that Beijing will replace New York as the “new global capital,” two pages on the possibility of a “Chinese commonwealth,” and similarly breezy, unsubstantiated claims that Mandarin will replace English as the global language, Chinese universities will dominate the global education, and Chinese films will attract a following that exceeds that of Hollywood. 

As a long-time resident of Beijing, I would love to see this city replace New York in global significance. As a fan of Chinese literature and movies, I would cheer at Chinese movies attaining global blockbuster status. As someone often frustrated by the limitations of American think tanks and universities, I would welcome an even stronger, more balanced intellectual infrastructure in the PRC. In short, although an American who loves my home society, I think it would be great if China reached a similar level of global influence as the US if only to better balance out the world system. 

Yet the evidence of such an evolution for Chinese society is not to be found in the pages of 《当中国统治世界 》， much less that China is on its way to actually “ruling” the world. Moreover, despite its claims to appreciate China as a “文明国家”, any thorough examination of Chinese civilization reveals that China historically has been decidedly uninterested in foreign conquest and more preoccupied with unifying the lands and people of its traditional sphere of influence. Only a true outsider to Chinese culture would anticipate a China that seeks global domination.

We live in an era where American power seems to be slipping. So it is easy to talk about American decline—as pessimistic commentators have been for decades—and try to identify a country to replace the US as de facto world leader. The key element the pessimists continually overlook is the dynamism of American society. Whatever its faults, American society is built on openness (so much so that any person in the world can become American) and pursuit of truth (a passion that traces back to the Greek philosophical origins of Western thought). Both these key characteristics of what we could (but usually do not) call “American civilization” strongly encourage debate and innovation. Thus the cultural and intellectual impact of the US goes far beyond whatever has or will become of the performance of American military forces or political maneuvering on the world stage. 

This latter point should be encouraging to China. It means that the country does not need to resort to costly and extremely risky efforts at hegemony. The more open, innovative, and vibrant Chinese society becomes, the more it will be in a position to influence the world beyond. China obviously is making important progress in this direction. But a vision that China will rule the world is as unattainable a vision as China’s collapse. Caricatured extremist portrayals do not reveal China’s future. Look instead at the efforts of China’s conscientious intellectuals, pioneering innovators, and forward-thinking entrepreneurs who are actively forging the nation’s future rather than merely trying to describe it.